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SYMPOSIUM
THE ROLE OF LIABILITY RULES AND THE
DERIVATIVE SUIT IN CORPORATE LAW: A
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANAYLSIS
Daniel R. Fischel t
and Michael Bradley 1
I
INTRODUCTION
Liability rules create incentives to engage in socially desirable
conduct. Tort rules, for example, are beneficial because they create
incentives for automobile drivers to drive more carefully than they
otherwise would. This characteristic of liability rules has led many
to argue that such rules should be more frequently utilized in the
publicly-held corporation to minimize divergences of interest be-
tween managers and investors.' Proposals have included expanding
both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty; these proposals would
expand the potential legal liability which corporate managers face.
t Professor of Law, University of Chicago. B.A. 1972, Cornell University; M.A.
1974, Brown University; J.D. 1977, University of Chicago.
Associate Professor of Finance, University of Michigan Graduate School of Busi-
ness Administration and Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
B.A. 1969, University of Idaho; M.B.A. 1974 Syracuse University; Ph.D. 1979 University
of Chicago. The authors thank Walter Blum, Frank Easterbrook, John Langbein, Geof-
frey Miller, Richard Posner, Roberta Romano, Steven Shavell, and workshop partici-
pants at Yale University and the University of Chicago for helpful comments. The Law
and Economics Center of Emory University provided support for the project.
I See, e.g., Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and
Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEx. L. REv. 591 (1983) (criticizing
overuse of business judgment rule and suggesting standards to guide judges in duty of
care evaluations); Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31
Bus. LAW. 883 (1976) (comparing state and federal treatment of managers' fiduciary
responsibility); March, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAw. 35 (1966) (criticizing lenient
judicial attitude toward conflict of interest transactions); Vagts, Challenges to Executive
Compensation: For the Market or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231 (1983) (suggesting that
courts monitor executive compensation agreements). Many of these proposals are
adopted in some form in the AMERICAN LAW INsTrrTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982; Tent. Draft No. 2,
1984; Tent. Draft. No. 3, 1984; Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985; Council Draft No. 5, 1985;
Discussion Draft No. 1, 1985) (Council Draft No. 5 is a preliminary draft and has not
been approved by the Council or membership of the ALI) [hereinafter cited as ALI
PROJECT].
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Related proposals have focused on the need to strengthen the
derivative suit.2 Proponents claim that the derivative suit, a suit
brought by a shareholder on behalf of the corporation, is essential
to enforce the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Absent such an
enforcement mechanism, the argument runs, corporate managers
could engage in wrongdoing with impunity so long as they decline
to sue themselves.
Recent controversy has centered on the scope ofjudicial review
to be applied to decisions by special litigation committees to termi-
nate derivative suits against directors. Because the members of
these committees are chosen by the same directors who are named
in the derivative suit, some courts have held that the committee's
decision to terminate a derivative suit should be subject to close ju-
dicial review.3 Reducing the ability-of directors or their agents to
terminate derivative suits, like expanding the scope of the duties of
care and loyalty, would increase directors' potential legal liability.
The underlying premise of these proposals is that greater legal
liability will reduce agency costs by more closely aligning the inter-
ests of managers and investors. The validity of this premise, how-
ever, is far from obvious. First, existing evidence suggests that the
widespread assumption that corporate managers systematically act
in ways contrary to investors' best interests is without foundation.
4
Thus, there may be no problem that needs to be addressed by ex-
panding directors' legal liability.
5
Second, liability rules create both costs and benefits; as a result,
2 See, e.g., Buxbaum, Conflict-of-Interest Statutes and the Need for a Demand on Directors in
Derivative Actions, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1122 (1980) (suggesting standards for courts to use
in deciding whether directors' refusal to sue should terminate derivative suits); Coffee &
Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Re-
form, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1981) (proposing legislation that would decrease Board of
Directors' powers to terminate derivative suits); Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the
Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 745 (1985) (not-
ing that too many purposes weaken derivative suits); Dent, The Power of Directors to Termi-
nate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96 (1980)
(proposing state court actions to strengthen derivative suits); Scott, Corporation Law and
the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983) (recom-
mending removal of impediments to derivative suits enforcing the fiduciary duty of
loyalty).
3 See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that business judg-
ment rule does not apply when special litigation committee recommends terminating
derivative suit), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d
779 (Del. 1981) (abandoning business judgment rule and adopting balancing test for
reviewing board or committee terminations of derivative suits). At least one commenta-
tor has suggested that special litigation committees could cause the "death" of deriva-
tive suits. See Dent, supra note 2.
4 For a comprehensive summary of the evidence, see Easterbrook, Managers'Discre-
tion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984).
5 See Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982), for
a general discussion of this point.
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their imposition may not be desirable. In many situations, liability
rules play little or no role in creating incentives for beneficial con-
duct. For example, elected officials, regulators, judges, and other
types of government officials are relatively unaffected by liability
rules.6 Although public officials are probably the best known exam-
ple in which the significance of liability rules is minimal, other exam-
ples exist. Most significant for our purposes, certain types of
contracts depend on mechanisms other than liability rules for
enforcement.
7
The value of liability rules in assuring contractual performance
depends on a number of factors which are discussed in Part II.
Analysis of these factors suggests that liability rules play a relatively
minor role in assuring contractual performance by corporate man-
agers in publicly-held corporations. Part II also demonstrates that
the problems with liability rules are aggravated when enforcement is
by derivative suit (rather than an action by the corporation acting
through its directors) because of the poor incentives that small
shareholders and their attorneys have to maximize the value of the
firm.
After briefly surveying alternative governance mechanisms for
publicly-held corporations in Part III, Part IV reports the results of
an empirical study we conducted of derivative suits. Proposals to
expand the scope of fiduciary duties and strengthen the derivative
suit necessarily assume that liability rules are highly valued by inves-
tors as a governance mechanism. Part IV demonstrates, however,
that this assumption is not supported by the existing evidence.
Part V then discusses a variety of doctrines in corporate law.
We argue that the effect of these doctrines is primarily to displace
the operation of liability rules. Thus, corporate law is in the main
consistent with our conclusion that liability rules play a minor role
in assuring contractual performance in publicly-held corporations.
Finally, Part VI applies the analysis in preceding sections to the
most recent draft of the chapter on remedies of the American Law
Institute Project on Corporate Governance. 8 Part VII is a
conclusion.
6 See, e.g., P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT (1983); Ackerman, Bureaucratic Control
and Imperfect Information (Colum. Working Paper 1984); Mashaw, Civil Liability of Govern-
ment Officers: Property Rights and Official Accountability, 42 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 8 (1978).
7 See, e.g., Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance,
89J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981); Knoeber, An Alternative Mechanism to Assure Contractual Relia-
bility, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1983); Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963); Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements,
53 J. Bus. L. 27 (1980); Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Ex-
change, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983). See also Ellickson, Of Coase, Cattle and Cooperation:
Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County (draft 1984).
8 ALI PROJECT, supra note 1, Council Draft No. 5.
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II
LIABILITY RULES AS A GOVERNANCE MECHANISM
Liability rules are a method of assuring contractual perform-
ance. But they are not the only method. Recent work has demon-
strated that the importance of liability rules in assuring contractual
performance varies dramatically in different contexts. 9 Where liabil-
ity rules are likely to be ineffective, parties have incentives to adopt
alternative governance structures to assure contractual per-
formance.
A. The Limits of Liability Rules in Reducing Agency Costs in
Publicly-Held Corporations
The importance of liability rules in assuring contractual per-
formance depends on a variety of factors: the ability to negotiate,
draft, and enforce complete (state contingent) contracts at a low
cost; whether repeat transactions are contemplated; the efficiency of
information markets; the extent to which gains from a contractual
arrangement depend on a long-term relationship; the gains from
breach; and comparative risk bearing ability. Analysis of these fac-
tors illustrates the limited usefulness of liability rules as a govern-
ance mechanism in the public corporation.
1. The Cost of Contracting
Contracts define the performance obligations of respective par-
ties and provide a basis for remedies if an obligation is not fulfilled.
Because the issue of whether a given act constitutes a breach of the
performance obligation is commonly in doubt, and remedies are
generally not self-executing, resolution of contractual disputes typi-
cally requires the intervention of a third party such as a court.
The role of contracts and the remedies for breach illustrate the
limitations of liability rules. In some situations, specifying perform-
ance obligations ex ante is very difficult (costly) because future con-
tingencies are often unforeseeable. Even if future contingencies are
foreseeable, defining the appropriate responses to them may be im-
possible. Furthermore, assuming that performance obligations can
be specified at the outset, enforcement may be costly ex post. For
example, monitoring costs will be high whenever it is difficult to dis-
tinguish poor performance of the agent from other possible causes
of a bad outcome (i.e., poor performance of other agents, adverse
market movements, or other random events). The probability that a
court will misinterpret the intent of the parties may also make reli-
ance on liability rules an undesirable method of assuring contractual
9 See authorities cited supra note 7.
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performance. When the costs of contracting-the combination of
negotiating, monitoring, and error costs-are high, parties have in-
centives to devise methods other than liability rules to assure con-
tractual performance.
The high costs of contracting preclude writing contracts that
completely define the duties of corporate managers. As noted,
identifying all possible contingencies as well as appropriate re-
sponses is highly impractical because the direct costs of negotiating
and drafting such contracts would be prohibitive. More impor-
tantly, attempts to define in advance what managers should do in
light of certain contingencies may simply prove to be wrong in light
of new information and expertise. Thus, the direct and indirect
costs of defining all possible future contingencies that might affect
managers' decisionmaking (i.e., changes in interest rates, changes in
demand for the firm's products, new technologies, and so forth), as
well as responses to these contingencies, make defining adequate
performance impossible.10
Monitoring costs also make heavy reliance on liability rules im-
practical as a method of assuring contractual performance. Because
managers work in teams and their performance is affected by ran-
dom events such as market movements, monitoring the effort or
output of any individual manager is very costly. It is difficult, for
example, to imagine using liability rules as a remedy for lack of ef-
fort by managers, even though this phenomenon represents per-
haps the single largest source of agency costs.
The problem of error costs is similar. Courts have as much dif-
ficulty as other agents in measuring managers' efforts or output.
Moreover, the difficulties faced by a court are complicated by sam-
ple bias. Because most lawsuits follow poor outcomes, courts natu-
rally tend to assume that such outcomes are a product of bad
actions. This bias can be a source of substantial error costs and can
greatly discourage any risk taking by managers. Managers have a
10 It is interesting to compare firms' contracts with bondholders' and shareholders'.
Because bondholders are promised a fixed return, bondholders' contracts often contain
detailed provisions limiting managers' discretion to take actions that might jeopardize
payment of the promised return. Contracts with shareholders are far less detailed and
commonly consist of only the relatively general corporate charter, by-laws, and other
internal documents. Even the more detailed contracts between the firm and bondhold-
ers do not specifically constrain the firm's production/investment decisions. From the
perspective of the firm's bondholders, the ideal performance contract would require the
firm's management to accept all positive net present value projects and reject all nega-
tive net present value projects. Obviously, such a contract would be far too costly to
write and enforce. Consequently, bond contracts typically only deal with the firm's fu-
ture financing and dividend decisions. They rarely, if ever, place specific contractual
restrictions on the firm's production/investment decisions. See Smith & Warner, On Fi-
nancial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979).
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tendency to avoid risk because they cannot diversify the value of
their human capital. Shareholders, however, can better diversify
risk because of their access to capital markets; therefore, they want
to create incentives for managers to accept all positive net present
value projects, even those that are risky. By definition, however,
risky projects can have poor outcomes; if managers are sued when-
ever decisions that were optimal ex ante turn out poorly ex post,
they will tend to avoid risky projects. This result-reinforcement of
managers' tendency to avoid risk-may be precisely what the parties
to the initial agreement sought to avoid.
Because of these costs of contracting, traditional breach of con-
tract remedies play no role in assuring the contractual performance
of corporate managers. As a substitute for breach of contract reme-
dies, corporate law has developed the fiduciary principle. Best un-
derstood as an implied term in the agency agreement that managers
act to further shareholders' presumptive goal of wealth maximiza-
tion, the fiduciary principle lowers the costs of contracting."' The
extreme generality of the fiduciary principle, however, limits its ap-
plication to the most extreme cases.
1 2
2. Whether Repeat Transactions Are Contemplated
Poor performance is a rational strategy if the present gains ex-
ceed the present value of future costs. The relationship between
present gains and future costs depends in large part on the likeli-
hood of repeat transactions. The lower the probability of repeat
transactions, the greater the incentive to perform poorly.
Itinerant street vendors illustrate the classic situation in which
repeat transactions are not anticipated. Because such vendors typi-
cally have no brand name to protect and seldom engage in multiple
transactions with the same buyer, they have strong incentives to mis-
represent product quality in order to obtain a higher price; the pres-
ent value of future costs of such conduct is likely to be small. Thus,
poor performance in current periods to achieve even small gains is a
rational strategy. At the opposite extreme is a seller of high quality
products where quality is continually monitored by a well-known
rating agency or consumer magazine. Here the present value of fu-
ture costs caused by misrepresenting product quality is likely to be
large because of the adverse consequences to the seller's reputation.
11 For a general discussion of the fiduciary principle, see Easterbrook & Fischel,
Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982). For a similar analysis of standard
form terms that reduce the costs of contracting in other types of principal-agent rela-
tionships, see Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981).
12 As we discuss in Part IV, other doctrines of corporate law limit the scope of the
fiduciary principle even further.
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This contraint, resulting from the prospect of repeat transactions,
decreases the importance of liability rules as a method of assuring
contractual performance.
Managers of public corporations are repeat players in several
respects. Even if managers need not regularly tap capital markets to
raise funds, their wealth is tied to the value of the firm which is
monitored continuously. Moreover, because managers realize that
their performance determines their value in labor markets, they
must balance any gains from poor performance, including self-deal-
ing, against foregone compensation in future periods. As the pres-
ent value of foregone compensation in future periods increases
relative to the current gains from poor performance, liability rules
become less important in assuring contractual performance. 13
3. The Efficiency of Information Markets
Whether poor performance in current periods is a rational
strategy also depends on the efficiency of information markets.
Where such markets are relatively inefficient, the probability of poor
performance increases. For example, poor performance by a doctor
may cause a patient to go elsewhere, assuming the patient does not
equate the bad result with bad luck; this prospect gives doctors
some incentive to perform well. This incentive is weakened, how-
ever, by the absence of an efficient information market whereby re-
sults of performance are reflected in prices. Disappointed patients
cannot sell shares in a doctor to communicate information to the
market.
Managers of public corporations face a very different type of
information market. Indeed, few information markets are as effi-
cient as capital markets where a firm's securities are publicly traded.
Poor performance in efficient capital markets will have several sig-
nificant consequences. First, investors (both informed and unin-
formed) will pay less for shares. The more investors believe that
their dollars will be used by those in control of firms in ways incon-
sistent with maximizing the value of the firm, the less they will pay
for shares. To minimize this rational fear of investors, those in con-
trol have incentives to adopt governance mechanisms that limit their
discretion to benefit at investors' expense.'
4
Second, accurate price signals in capital markets contribute to
13 Thus, poor performance is likely to be more profitable for older than for
younger workers. Agreements providing for a lump sum payment upon retirement as-
suming satisfactory performance can reduce the risk that older workers will perform
poorly, however.
14 See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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the efficiency of labor markets. Share price information provides a
relatively low cost method of evaluating the performance of corpo-
rate managers. Such information can be used to set managers' com-
pensation within the firm as well as to measure their opportunity
wage in external labor markets.
Finally, efficient capital markets facilitate the operation of the
market for corporate control. The market for corporate control
provides managers with an incentive to perform well and thus keep
share prices high, as well as a device for displacing management
teams who perform poorly. 15 The efficient operation of the capital,
labor, and takeover markets all raise the future costs of poor per-
formance, thereby helping to assure contractual performance.
4. The Extent to Which Anticipated Gains Depend on a
Long Term Relationship
The gains from exchange in many contracts do not depend on
the identity of the other party. If A purchases wheat from B and
then B refuses to perform, A can probably purchase wheat of identi-
cal quality from C without difficulty. Neither party in the above ex-
ample has a specific investment in the particular transaction, and the
gains from exchange thus do not depend on the continued presence
of either party.
But not all contracts are of this type. Assume A contracts with B
for the construction of a nuclear power plant. At the time the con-
tract was entered into B was one of many contractors with the neces-
sary expertise. Over time, however, it is likely that B will acquire
certain skills and expertise that are specialized to this particular
transaction. Other contractors who were once close to perfect sub-
stitutes for B now are decidedly inferior because they have not made
the same transaction-specific investment. 16
Now assume B breaches some term of the agreement. A is in a
bind. If A fires B or causes B to walk off the job by suing B, the cost
and expense of the plant might go up substantially because some
other contractor will now need to acquire the transaction-specific
skills of B. A might well conclude that it is better off by continuing
the deal with B, the breaching party, and avoiding these costs.
17
15 For a discussion of the relationship between efficient capital markets and the
takeover mechanism, see Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Fischel, Efficient Capital
Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57
TrEx. L. REV. 1 (1978).
16 For a sampling of the literature on transaction-specific investments, see Goetz &
Scott, supra note 11; Williamson, supra note 7; Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The
Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. LAw & EcoN. 233 (1979).
17 For this reason, contract law has developed the principle that sometimes the
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Of course, it is likely that A anticipated the risk that B might
behave opportunistically and the relative ineffectiveness of litigation
in resolving disputes. In this event, A might have insisted on other
mechanisms to give B incentives to perform and resolve disputes
should they occur. Examples of the former are performance bonds
and incentive clauses with lump sum payments upon completion by
a satisfactory time; an example of the latter is one of compulsory
arbitration. Ex ante, both parties benefit from the lowest cost
method of assuring contractual performance which will frequently
not be litigation. Indeed, one of the striking findings of those who
have studied contracts where transaction-specific investments are
common is how rarely litigation is actually used to enforce contrac-
tual obligations.1 8 Other governance mechanisms are far more im-
portant in assuring contractual performance.
Contracts involving labor have long been recognized as having
the potential for firm or transaction-specific investments. Corporate
managers will frequently possess expertise and skills that are spe-
cialized to a particular firm. Replacement of such individuals is
costly because their replacements will lack equivalent firm-specific
expertise. To avoid imposition of these costs, the parties at the time
of the initial agreement may emphasize other methods of assuring
contractual performance than the threat of termination. Similarly,
once breach has occurred, the nonbreaching party (assuming breach
can be defined) may view termination only as a remedy of last resort.
In many cases, litigation will have the same undesirable conse-
quences as termination because of its disruptive effects on ongoing
relationships.' 9 Thus litigation, like termination, will frequently be
deemphasized as a governance mechanism at the time of agreement,
and avoided by the nonbreaching party after a breach has occurred.
The existence of firm-specific investments may explain the ob-
served reluctance of special litigation committees to sue corporate
managers accused of wrongdoing.20 Even if those accused are no
nonbreaching party has a duty to continue to deal with the breaching party in order to
mitigate damages. See Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of
Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967 (1983); Mudis, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law
of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981).
18 See Ellickson, supra note 7; Goldberg & Erickson, Long-Term Contracts for Petroleum
Coke, (U.C.D. Working Paper 1982); Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long Term Contracts:
The Case of Mine-Mouth Coal Power Plants, (M.I.T. Working Paper 1984); Macaulay, supra
note 7.
19 See Williamson, supra note 7.
20 Of course, other explanations for a special litigation committee's refusal to sue
also exist. The refusal to sue may result from a determination that there has been no
wrongdoing or that the costs of litigating (including error and other indirect costs) ex-
ceed the likely benefits, or because the members of the committee have a conflict of
interest. We discuss the conflict of interest aspect of decisionmaking by special litigation
committees in Part II B below. For a further discussion of the issue, see Dent, supra note
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longer with the firm, those acting on behalf of the firm can rationally
be concerned with the effect of litigation on others who remain.
The greater the threat of litigation, the less willing those who re-
main with the firm will be to make firm-specific investments of
human capital.
5. The Gains from Breach
The larger the potential gains from breach, the more impor-
tant, all else equal, are liability rules. Thus the spectre of civil liabil-
ity (and/or imposition of criminal penalties) is probably a useful
deterrent to large one-shot frauds. Because one-shot frauds can oc-
cur in publicly-held corporations, use of liability rules in this narrow
class of cases is probably desirable.
21
6. Relative Attitudes Toward Risk
If information were costless, liability would be imposed against
an agent only if his conduct fell below a gicen standard of perform-
ance. Because information is costly, however, the possibility exists
that a, poor outcome will be equated with poor performance. If
agents are penalized for poor outcomes, as well as poor perform-
ance, they will tend to undertake lower risk projects. This tendency
to cause agents to behave in a more risk-averse manner is itself a
potentially large cost of liability rules as a governance mechanism in
contractual situations where principals want agents to behave in a
more risk-neutral manner.
22
As we have discussed, the publicly-held corporation where
shareholders are specialized risk bearers is a classic example of this
cost of liability rules.2 3 Such rules in a world of costly information
have the effect of transferring risk from more efficient to less effi-
cient risk bearers (shareholders to managers); thus the rules reduce
the benefits of the specialization of function in public
corporations.
24
2; Comment, Special Litigation Committees-An Expanding and Potent Threat to Shareholder De-
rivative Suits, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 169 (1980); Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative
Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 600 (1980).
21 It is important to understand, however, that liability rules are not the only deter-
rent to large one-shot frauds. For example, requiring managers to own shares in the
firm decreases the probability of fraudulent acts because managers must then bear more
of the costs of their actions. See infra text accompanying notes 38-41.
22 See Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE LJ. 1231, 1235 (1984) (not-
ing that "[e]mpirically, principals are usually better risk bearers than their agents").
23 We do not suggest that managers should bear no risk. As we discuss in Part III
below, compensation agreements typically link manager wealth with firm performance
to provide managers with incentives to maximize the value of the firm. Thus, some firms
may, for incentive reasons, cause managers to bear more risk than is ordinarily optimal.
24 For an excellent analysis of this differential risk-bearing ability in the context of
[Vol. 71:261270
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B. Special Problems of the Derivative Suit
The problems associated with the use of liability rules as a cor-
porate governance mechanism are exacerbated when the parties
charged with enforcement have poor incentives to make correct de-
cisions. This is obviously true when members of a board allegedly
involved in wrongdoing must decide whether to sue themselves. In-
deed, skepticism of directors who have been asked to sue them-
selves, or of persons named by the directors to make this decision
(special litigation committees), seems to be the most common ra-
tionale for the need to toughen the derivative suit.25 What this ar-
gument overlooks, however, is that individual shareholders and
their attorneys who bring suit on behalf of the corporation also have
very poor incentives to maximize shareholders' wealth.
The voting rules in corporate law, which we discuss more fully
below, ensure that shareholders with the largest economic stake in a
venture have the greatest effect on corporate policy. Because share-
holders with the largest stakes will gain the most from good per-
formance and bear most of the costs of bad performance, they have
the best incentives to maximize the value of the firm. Small minori-
ties have no power to act on behalf of the corporation or thwart the
will of the majority. Minority shareholders' relative lack of power
does not disadvantage them, however, because they too benefit
from a system that gives decisionmaking authority to those parties
with the best incentives to maximize the value of the firm.
The derivative suit is a striking exception to this fundamental
principle of corporate law. Shareholders with tiny investments can
bring derivative actions on behalf of a corporation. Because of his
small stake in the venture, the complaining shareholder (or his at-
torney) has very little incentive to consider the effect of the action
on other shareholders, the supposed beneficiaries, who ultimately
bear the costs. If the action appears to be a positive net value pro-
ject because of the possible recovery of attorneys' fees, 26 an attorney
suits by third parties against the corporation, see Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies
and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).
25 See Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 1127; Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 283;
Dent, supra note 2, at 110-18; Scott, supra note 2, at 940.
26 Shareholders who own small stakes in the firm have little incentive to bring a
derivative suit because the benefits of the suit accrue to shareholders according to the
size of their holdings, not their efforts in bringing the action. This suggests that the real
party in interest is the attorney. The prospect of attorneys' fees overcomes the collective
action problem faced by shareholders. But a legal rule that relies on private attorneys
general for enforcement involves substantial costs. If everyone has the right to sue
(what a private attorney general system means), high transaction costs prevent value-
increasing exchanges and encourage opportunistic behavior. This is the economic justi-
fication for the legal doctrine of standing. SeeJensen, Meckling & Holderness, Analysis of
Alternative Standing Doctrines, (U. Rochester Working Paper 1984).
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will pursue it regardless of its effect on the value of the firm. 27
Sometimes this perverse incentive created by allowing a party
with only a nominal stake in the venture to determine corporate pol-
icy is obvious. The spate of derivative suits in the 1970s challenging
the making of foreign payments notwithstanding the profitability of
the practice illustrates the divergence of interests between a deriva-
tive plaintiff and shareholders as a class. Sometimes the perverse
incentive is less obvious but no less real. Consider the situation of a
negotiated merger at a premium over the market price. State corpo-
ration statutes typically require a majority, or at most two-thirds, of
shareholders to approve merger transactions. Unanimous consent
of shareholders is not required because a unanimity requirement
would, among other problems, create incentives for shareholders to
behave strategically. Any shareholder, even if convinced the merger
was beneficial and the terms fair, could rationally decide to refuse
consent. Such a shareholder would reason that the cost imposed on
all other shareholders (the premium foregone) would force the cor-
poration to "buy" the shareholder's approval with some type of side
payment. Such behavior would be privately rational but wealth re-
ducing for shareholders as a whole. In addition to resources wasted
in haggling over the division of gains, some value increasing trans-
actions would be abandoned altogether or never started under a
unanimity rule because of the strategic power of minorities.
Thus, shareholder suits create a risk of strategic behavior by
minorities. 28 The shareholder who is unable to blackmail other
shareholders due to the absence of a unanimity rule can attempt to
accomplish the same objective by alleging in a suit that some aspect
of the terms or disclosure in connection with the merger was inade-
quate. Once again, the hope would be that the potential loss in-
flicted on other shareholders (the nominal beneficiaries of the
action) in the form of direct and indirect litigation costs as well as
the possible loss of the premium would enable the shareholder (or
27 This suggests that the method of compensating attorneys and assessing costs is
crucially important in minimizing conflicts of interest between attorneys and investors,
the supposed beneficiaries of the action. See Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General.
Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215 (1983). We
do not discuss this issue here. For our purposes, recognizing that no system of awarding
attorneys' fees or assessing costs is perfect is sufficient. The value of managers' time, for
example, will never be compensated for, no matter how frivolous the action. Thus, our
major point, that the imperfect incentives of directors and their agents should not be
compared with a hypothetical system of perfect enforcement, is unaffected by the choice
of rule regarding attorneys' fees.
28 It is important to recognize that share ownership is not immutable. A share-
holder who believed that the value of the firm would increase after the filing of a lawsuit
could aggregate a large block of shares in the same manner as a prospective bidder for
control. Casual empiricism suggests, however, that complaining shareholders do not
aggregate shares before filing suit; they typically have only a nominal interest in the firm.
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his attorney) to capture a disproportionate share of the gains.29
In addition to this problem of perverse incentives, there is also
the problem of access to information and expertise. Managers, not
small shareholders or plaintiffs' attorneys, direct the corporations'
affairs. What looks like a hasty decision by corporate managers may
simply reflect their knowledge of the subject and their desire to
avoid the expense of hiring outside experts. For instance, a seem-
ingly self-interested decision to accelerate the exercise of a stock op-
tion may well be the most efficient method of awarding an increase
in compensation. Thus, even when shareholders and their attorneys
have proper motives, their lack of expertise and access to relevant
information will frequently make it difficult for them to determine
which management actions are inconsistent with maximizing the
value of the firm.
The poor incentives and lack of expertise of small shareholders
and their attorneys would be less important if courts were skilled at
recognizing suits that do not increase the value of the firm. Unfor-
tunately, judges also lack business expertise and strong incentives to
maximize the value of the firm. A manager who makes bad business
decisions is likely to have his wealth reduced or be fired; judges who
make bad business decisions will continue in office with the same
salary as before. Moreover, it is important to recognize that judges,
no matter how competent, cannot eliminate the problems created by
the ability of small shareholders and their attorneys to sue. So long
as the full costs of the suit are not assessed (including the value of
managers' time), the threat of strategic behavior will exist.
Our point is not that all derivative suits are either strategically
motivated or frivolous. Rather, our point is that there are real costs
to the derivative suit because of the risk of strategic behavior and
uninformed decisionmaking. It is thus incorrect to conclude that
the "structural bias" of the board-the alleged reluctance of manag-
ers who are named as wrongdoers or special litigation committees
appointed by such managers to take proper action 3 0 -demonstrates
the need for more vigorous enforcement of derivative suits. This
argument represents a form of the Nirvana fallacy: it compares im-
perfect incentives of corporate managers and their agents with a
mythical perfect enforcement scheme and concludes, not surpris-
ingly, that perfect enforcement dominates. But the relevant ques-
29 For a discussion of the problem of strategic use of litigation in the merger con-
text, see Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in
Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913, 923-41 (1982); Fischel, The Appraisal
Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 875, 898-901.
30 The directors' choice of the special litigation committee's members is not as unu-
sual as some critics suggest. Directors, for example, also choose the accounting firm
that monitors the firm.
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tion is which of two very imperfect classes of decisionmakers-
managers allegedly involved in wrongdoing or individuals named by
them to serve on special litigation committees on the one hand or
shareholders with a small economic stake in the venture represented
by plaintiffs' attorneys and judges on the other hand-is more likely
to make decisions that increase the value of the firm. Alternatively,
in light of the imperfections of both classes of decisionmakers and
the limits of the liability rules discussed above, firms have incentives
to create alternative methods of assuring contractual performance.
III
ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ASSURING CONTRACTUAL
PEFORMANCE
The role of liability rules as a governance mechanism can be
analyzed only in comparison with other governance mechanisms.
We discuss some of the alternative governance mechanisms to liabil-
ity rules below.
A. Freely Transferable Shares with Votes Attached
Under modern enabling legislation, individuals who form cor-
porations have wide latitude in determining how they should be
structured. It would be possible, for example, for each shareholder
to have an equal number of votes (or no votes) or to restrict share-
holders' ability to sell their shares. With rare exception, however,
votes in public corporations are apportioned by shares, not share-
holders, and shares are freely transferable.
The rationale for this fundamental aspect of corporate structure
is clear. The principle of one share-one vote enables those with the
largest stake in the venture to have the greatest impact on the firm's
decisionmaking. Because such parties will reap more of the benefits
of good performance and bear more of the costs if things turn out
poorly, they have better incentives to maximize the value of the firm
than do those with a smaller stake in the venture. Small sharehold-
ers are also better off if those with the best incentives to maximize
the value of the firm are given that authority. The voting rules
adopted by most corporations, in sum, have the effect of reducing
agency costs to the benefit of all shareholders regardless of the size
of their investment. 31
The absence of restrictions on alienability in public corpora-
tions also has the effect of reducing agency costs by facilitating the
31 For a more general discussion, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law,
26J. L. & ECON. 395 (1983). For an analysis of why some firms have deviated from the
one share-one vote rule, see DeAngelo & DeAngelo, Managerial Ownership of Voting
Rights, 14J. FIN. ECON. 33 (1985).
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formation of control blocs and transfers of control. As an increas-
ingly impressive body of evidence demonstrates, both the formation
of control blocs which decrease the costs of monitoring and transfer
of control which moves assets to higher valued uses increase the
value of investments and are thus beneficial for shareholders. 32
B. Internal and External Monitoring
The separation of the management and risk-bearing functions
in public corporations allows investors to capture the benefits of
specialization of function but exposes them to the risk that their
funds will be used for managers' personal benefit. Investors will
discount the price they are willing to pay for shares accordingly. To
minimize the size of this discount, those who raise capital have in-
centives to establish institutional arrangements whereby the per-
formance of managers is continually monitored. Such monitoring
arrangements reduce the probability of managerial misconduct.
Monitoring arrangements take a variety of forms. Inside direc-
tors of a corporation monitor the officers; top managers monitor
lower level managers, and vice-versa.3 3 The increasing use of in-
dependent directors in public corporations also can be viewed as an
institutional response to the demand by investors for greater inter-
nal monitoring. Similarly, the much-maligned special litigation
committee formed in response to a derivative suit can be analyzed in
the same manner. Examples of external monitoring include selling
securities through investment bankers, 34 using independent third
party accountants to certify financial statements,3 5 listing securities
on a stock exchange,36 and regularly paying dividends to ensure
continual availability of funds in the capital markets. 37 External la-
bor markets and the market for corporate control also act as
monitors of managerial performance.
C. Managerial Stock Ownership and Executive
Compensation Agreements
An additional method to reduce agency costs is to tie manage-
32 The evidence is summarized in Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Contro"
The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983).
33 Fama, Agency Problems and the Theoy of the Firm, 88J. PoL. EcoN. 288 (1980). See
also Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983).
34 Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L.
REV. 669, 675 (1984); Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L.
REV. 549, 613-22 (1984).
35 Watts & Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditors, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evi-
dence, 26J. L. & ECON. 613, 630-33 (1983).
36 See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 34, at 565-92.




rial compensation to firm performance. Extensive evidence indi-
cates that managers own a surprisingly large amount of their firm's
outstanding securities, both in absolute and percentage terms;38 fur-
thermore, other important types of compensation such as stock op-
tions or phantom stock also link compensation to firm
performance. 39 When all aspects of managerial compensation are
taken into account (stock based measures of compensation as well as
salaries, bonuses, etc.), the evidence suggests that changes in mana-
gerial wealth are closely tied to changes in the value of the firm.
40
Thus, compensation schemes tend to align managerial incentives
with those of investors.4'
Of course, we do not claim that these governance mechanisms
operate without cost or reduce agency costs to zero.42 Because
managers work in teams, the marginal product of each manager is
impossible to measure. No matter how effective the contractual and
market mechanisms are, some shirking is inevitable. Thus, liability
rules enforced by derivative suits may operate simply as an addi-
tional, albeit imperfect, governance mechanism. The theory of con-
tract enforcement discussed above, however, suggests that liability
rules enforced by derivative suits play only a minor role in enforcing
the express and implied agreements between managers of public
corporations and residual claimants. 43 Moreover, our own empiri-
cal study, described below, provides no support for the hypothesis
that shareholders value liability rules as a governance mechanism.
38 See, e.g., Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J. L. &
EcoN. 375, 387-90 (1983).
39 See, e.g., Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Renumeration, 7 J. Ac-r. &
ECON. 11 (1985).
40 See, e.g., Benston, The Self-Serving Management Hypothesis: Some Evidence, 7 J. AccT.
& ECON. 67 (1985).
41 For a more complete summary of compensation studies, see Easterbrook, supra
note 4.
42 Nor do we claim that the importance of these alternative governance mecha-
nisms, either singly or in combination, is the same for all firms. Some firms will rely
more on independent directors; others on the market for corporate control; still others
might make takeovers more difficult but require managers to have a large percentage of
their wealth tied up in their firm.
43 Significantly, states such as Delaware that have dominated in the competition for
corporate charters have legal rules which minimize, not maximize, managers' potential
legal liability. For a discussion of the relationship between Delaware law and sharehold-
ers' wealth, see R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978). See also Bays-
inger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28J. L. & ECON. 179
(1985); Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privi-
leges, 14J. LEGAL STD. 129 (1985); Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters:
"Unhealthy Competition" versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980); Fischel, supra note
29; Romano, Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle (Stan. L. & Econ. Program Working
Paper No. 19 (1984)). There is some evidence that the threat of legal liability of manag-




EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE WEALTH EFFECTS OF
DERIVATIVE STOCKHOLDER SUITS
In this section we examine the change in the market price of the
common stock of firms involved in derivative stockholder suits.44
Our purpose is to determine whether such litigation is in the inter-
est of the firm's stockholders.
Our initial intent was to examine the stock market's response to
the various stages of a derivative action: the initial filing of the com-
plaint, the meeting of demand requirements, the rulings of special
litigation committees, and the final resolution of the issue. How-
ever, because of the paucity of publicly available data concerning
these events, such a comprehensive study was beyond the scope of
this inquiry.4
5
That the financial press fails to report the events surrounding
derivative actions indicates, prima facie, that such litigation has little
or no effect on the market price of the firm's securities; if efficient
pricing of the firm's equity depended on these events, surely the
financial press would publish their occurrence. Because such litiga-
tion presumably has no material effect on their wealth, investors
have little demand for information on derivative litigation.
Unable to find either filing dates or settlement dates from the
financial press, we turned our attention to derivative suits in which
the firm's management sought to have court intervention halt the
litigation.46 In two situations a court will dismiss a derivative suit: if
the stockholder/plaintiff has failed to make sufficient demand on the
firm's management, 47 or if a special litigation committee, appointed
by the firm's management, decides that the suit is not in the corpo-
ration's best interests.
48
44 The raw data and results of this empirical analysis can be found in the Appendix,
infra.
45 None of the major financial publications systematically covers stockholder deriv-
ative suits. Indeed, a computer search of Barrons, Business Week, The New York Times, and
The Wall Street Journal over the past six years failed to turn up any of the recent landmark
cases in derivative stockholder litigation.
46 The facts and decisions in these cases are contained in the LEXIS and the West's
Federal Practice and Decennial Digest data bases.
47 See In re Kaufman Mutual Funds, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1973); Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984). See also Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a
Prerequisite to the Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746 (1960); Note, The Demand and Stand-
ing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 168 (1976).
48 See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979), in which the Court held that the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)(1) et seq., and the Investment Advi-
sors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)(1) et seq., did not require state or federal courts to
absolutely forbid termination by corporate directors of nonfrivolous derivative suits.
Since then, a number of courts have upheld the right of disinterested directors to termi-
nate derivative suits which are contrary to the firm's best interests. See, e.g., Abramowitz
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Our sample of derivative suits consists of those halted by court
action and those challenged by the firm's management but not dis-
missed by the courts. Table 1 lists the cases that courts dismissed
because the plaintiff failed to make sufficient demand on the firm's
management. Table 2 lists those suits that were dismissed because
of the decision of a special litigation committee. Table 3 lists the
cases in which the court excused demand and allowed the litigation
to proceed. Finally, Table 4 contains the cases in which the courts
ruled that the business judgment rule did not apply and thus vitiated
the decision of a special litigation committee to terminate the suit.
Our ultimate objective is to assess the effect of a derivative suit
on the wealth of a corporation's stockholders. However, because of
the data limitations discussed above, we are limited to examining
only the market reaction to judicial decisions of whether to termi-
nate or allow a derivative suit to continue. Obviously, for there to
be any market reaction to these decisions, they must not have been
fully anticipated by market participants. In other words, the court
decisions in our sample must have significantly changed the
probability that one side or the other would ultimately prevail in the
suit; otherwise, we would be studying a nonevent and would find no
market reaction to these court decisions.
Given this assumption, if derivative suits are, on average, in the
interests of the firm's stockholders, the market price of the firm's
shares should rise if the court allows the suit to proceed and fall if
the court dismisses it. A successful derivative suit might increase
the value of the firm's equity for two reasons. First, in most deriva-
tive suits, money is in dispute. Presumably, if the plaintiff prevails,
this money will flow back into the firm and be claimed by its equi-
tyholders. Second, if the potential of a derivative suit deters mana-
gerial malfeasance, then a successful suit should improve the extent
to which the firm is run in the interests of its stockholders. A suc-
cessful suit might put the firm's management on notice that they are
being monitored more closely, and this monitoring in turn will bet-
ter align managerial behavior with stockholder interests. Thus, the
price of the firm's stock should increase when a court rules that the
derivative suit should proceed, reflecting the expectation of a reduc-
tion in agency costs from increased monitoring.
By similar logic, the termination of a derivative suit might signal
to the market the court's unwillingness or inability to prevent the
firm's management from expropriating the wealth of the firm's equi-
tyholders. As a result, market participants may view the court's de-
v. Posner, 513 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), afd, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982) (Dela-




cision to terminate a derivative suit as having given the firm's
management a "license to steal." Thus, the termination of a deriva-
tive suit should decrease the value of the firm's shares by the dis-
counted value of the increase in agency costs arising from the
increased discretion that the court's decision gives the firm's
management.
Derivative suits may, on the other hand, reduce net stockholder
wealth. The litigation costs imposed on the firm may well exceed
the damages awarded even in successful suits. Some derivative suits
are based on public policy issues and, if won, clearly will reduce
stockholder wealth. For example, suits motivated by environmental
concerns or brought to halt the payment of bribes to foreign offi-
cials would, if successful, undoubtedly decrease the wealth of the
firm's equityholders. Finally, some argue that the derivative suit is
designed primarily to enhance the welfare of the plaintiffs, or the
plaintiffs' counsel, and not the welfare of the firm's equityholders in
general. Based on these considerations, the termination of a deriva-
tive suit might well increase the price of the firm's equity, and a con-
tinuance might decrease its market price.
Stock returns are taken from the data base compiled by the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) of the Graduate
School of Business of the University of Chicago. Because of the lim-
itations of this data base, we are able to analyze only those cases
involving firms listed on either the American or New York Stock Ex-
changes at the time of the decision and decisions rendered between
July 2, 1962, and December 31, 1983. Tables 1 through 4 list only
those observations that meet this CRSP-imposed criteria.
To estimate the stock price reaction (wealth effect) of the termi-
nation or continuation of a derivative suit, we performed a standard
event-study analysis on the firms named in the cases listed in Tables
1 through 4. Specifically, we calculated a daily abnormal return to
the shares of each firm in the sample according to the formula:
ARi, t = Ri,. - [.i+3iRmt] (1)
where
ARi,t = the abnormal return to the equity of firm i on day t
Ri,t = the realized return to the equity of firm i on day t
Rm,t = the realized return to the market portfolio on day t
c3, 0i = market model parameters estimated over event days t =
-280 through t = -41, where t = 0 ig the decision date.
The abnormal return defined in Equation 1 measures the mar-
ket's reaction to an event that is specific to firm i occurring on day t.
The bracketed expression in Equation 1 is the expected return to
security i on day t, given the realized return to the market portfolio
on day t (Rmt). Thus, the difference between the expected return
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given by the so-called market model (the bracketed expression in
Equation 1) and the realized return to a share of firm i on day t is an
estimate of the abnormal return to this security and is attributable to
some firm-specific event. ARi,, represents this abnormal return esti-
mate in Equation 1.49
To estimate the average share price reaction to a court's deci-
sion to terminate or permit a derivative suit, we grouped the daily
abnormal returns to each of the relevant firms into equally weighted
event-time portfolios. Algebraically, the abnormal return to each
"test" portfolio on each event day t was calculated according to the
following formula:
N
-AR I AR t  (2)
where
ARp,, = the abnormal return to portfolio p on event day I
ARi t = the abnormal return to security i on event day t
N = the number of firms in the portfolio
The standard deviation of the abnormal return to each portfolio is
taken from the abnormal returns calculated over the test period
(from t = -280 through t = -41, where t = 0 is the decision
date).
The results of our analysis of the wealth impact of a court deci-
sion to terminate a derivative stockholder suit are reported in Table
5. In the first row of the table, we report the average abnormal re-
turn to the stockholders of fourteen firms having suits dismissed for
failure to meet demand requirements. We report the average ab-
normal return (ARp) on the decision day, the cumulative average
abnormal return (CARP) from the decision day through the follow-
ing day, and the CARP from the decision day through the following
four days (defined in the table as the decision week). The data show
that while the point estimates of the average abnormal returns for
each of the three time periods reported are all negative, none are
statistically significant. The absolute values of all the t-statistics are
less than 1.96, which is the critical value for significance at the a =
.05 level. Based on these statistics, we conclude that the termina-
tion of a derivative suit for failure to meet demand requirements
does not significantly affect the wealth of the firm's stockholders.
The results for the sample of eighteen court-ordered termina-
tions based on rulings of special litigation committees, reported in
the second row of Table 5, suggest the same conclusion. None of
49 See E. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE (1976) (providing, in chapters 3-5, exten-
sive discussion of use of market model in empirical work).
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the point estimates of the average abnormal returns diverges signifi-
cantly from zero. Indeed, the point estimate of the average abnor-
mal return over the decision week is positive.
The only indication of a nonzero wealth effect from a court-
ordered termination is given by the abnormal return to the portfolio
of the entire sample on the decision day (ARp = -0.69%, t =
-2.13). However, neither the two-day CARP nor the five-day CARP
to this portfolio differs significantly from zero.
The average abnormal returns to the stockholders of firms hav-
ing derivative suits challenged by their management but not dis-
missed by court action are reported in Table 6. The first row
reports the returns to the stockholders of the ten firms in the sample
for which demand requirements were met or demand was excused.
The data show that although the point estimates of the average ab-
normal returns for each time period reported are positive, none di-
verges significantly from zero. This data is consistent with our
earlier conclusion that a court decision regarding the potential ter-
mination of a derivative suit has no material effect on the wealth of
the firm's stockholders.
In the second row of Table 6, we report the average abnormal
returns to the six firms in the sample involved in suits that were
challenged by management but not dismissed because the courts
ruled that the business judgment rule did not apply. The abnormal
return to this portfolio on the decision day does not differ signifi-
cantly from zero. However, the two-day cumulative abnormal return
to this portfolio is significantly positive (CARP = 2.26%, t = 2.25).
Thus, for these six firms, the failure of the courts to dismiss the suit
had a small, albeit significant, positive wealth effect. Still, the cumu-
lative abnormal return for the decision week is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero.
Summarizing the results in Tables 5 and 6, we find that neither
termination nor continuation of a derivative stockholder suit has a
significant effect on the wealth of the firm's stockholders. However,
the data show that the majority of the point estimates of the abnor-
mal returns to the firms that have suits terminated are negative and
the majority of those to the firms that do not have their suits termi-
nated are positive. In general, however, these point estimates are
not statistically different from zero.
The above results do not clearly indicate whether a derivative
suit increases the wealth of the firm's stockholders. On the one
hand, the majority of the point estimates indicate that derivative
suits, if allowed to proceed, increase stockholder wealth; this result
implies that such suits are a material check on managerial behavior.
On the other hand, the wealth effects are not strong (i.e., they are
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not statistically significant). The statistical insignificance of the re-
sults, however, may be due to our small sample (large standard er-
ror estimates) or the possibility that market participants had already
anticipated most of the effects of the decisions in our study and fac-
tored them into market prices. Nonetheless, we present our results,
offer our interpretations, and await further research on the wealth-
effects of derivative stockholder suits.
The results reported in this section show that a successful deriv-
ative suit, on average, has a slight positive effect on the wealth of the
firm's stockholders; a court's termination of such a suit has a slight
negative effect on shareholder wealth. However, the insignificant
magnitude of these wealth-effects suggests that such litigation does
not have a material impact on the ongoing relations between the
firm's management and its stockholders. The slight wealth-effects
evident in our empirical results are attributable to the fact that
stockholders will realize a gain if the suit is successful. These results
do not, however, indicate that the outcomes of the suits under study
materially affect the extent to which the managers of these firms act
in the interest of their stockholders. In other words, our results in-
dicate that derivative suits are not an important monitoring device
to curb managerial malfeasance. If derivative suits were effective
monitors we would expect a much greater market reaction to the
court decisions in this study.
To buttress this interpretation, we separated from our sample
those cases in which the derivative suit explicitly charged breach of
the duty of loyalty by the firm's management. Presumably, if deriva-
tive suits discipline corporate managers' behavior, these cases would
have the greatest wealth effects. Table 7 reports the results of our
analysis of the breach of duty of loyalty cases: eleven cases were
dismissed, and six were allowed to proceed. 50 The point estimates
of the abnormal returns are negative for the terminations and posi-
tive for the cases allowed to proceed; but, again, none significantly
differs from zero. Thus, the wealth-effects of cases explicitly charg-
ing breach of the duty of loyalty are not significantly different from
the wealth effects of our overall sample.
As in all empirical analyses, one must be careful not to carry the
interpretation of the results too far; this admonition is particularly
relevant for the data reported in this section. Our results are based
on a very small sample, include only cases that were challenged by
the firm's management, and measure the market's reaction to only
one stage in the entire derivative suit process. A more definitive
assessment of the empirical effects of derivative suits must await a
50 The firms included in these two samples are indicated by an "x" in the right
column in Tables I through 4.
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more comprehensive study which includes a larger sample and
measures returns over the various stages of the suit.
V
THE ROLE OF LIABILITY RULES IN CORPORATE LAW
Our conclusion that liability rules are relatively unimportant in
assuring contractual performance in public corporations appears in-
consistent with certain principles in corporate law, particularly the
duties of loyalty and care which can be enforced by derivative suit.
This inconsistency, however, is less serious than it might appear.
First, the very generality of fiduciary duties, as discussed above, lim-
its their application to relatively egregious cases. Moreover, other
principles of corporate law, such as the business judgment rule, the
substitution of procedural for substantive review of conflict of inter-
est transactions, the liberal rules concerning indemnification and in-
surance, the exclusivity of the appraisal remedy, and the limitations
on derivative suits, reduce the scope of liability rules. We describe
the significance of these aspects of corporate law below5 and con-
clude the section with a brief discussion of the inferences to be
drawn from the derivative suit's survival.
A. The Business Judgment Rule
Although formulations of the business judgment rule vary, 52
the rule's effect is relatively straightforward. The rule precludes ju-
dicial review of the merits of managerial decisions in a wide variety
of situations. It is commonly assumed that the rule's scope is lim-
ited to transactions that do not involve conflicts of interest. In prac-
tice, however, the rule's scope is much broader. Courts have
applied the rule to transactions between parent corporations and
their subsidiaries, 53 compensation decisions within a firm, 54 deci-
51 In so doing, we recognize that our discussion suggests that corporate law is more
uniform than it actually is. Different jurisdictions have different rules and sometimes
different rules exist within the same jurisdiction. Moreover, a recent decision by the
Delaware Supreme Court, Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), is a striking
counter-example to our principal conclusion in this section that various doctrines of
corporate law reflect the relative unimportance of liability rules in assuring contractual
performance. Notwithstanding these caveats, we feel that the discussion below captures
the essence of corporate law. The Van Gorkom case is criticized in Fischel, The Business
Judgment Rule and the Trans-Union Case, 40 Bus. LAw 1437 (1985).
52 Compare Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reef? An
Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared with Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LW. 919
(1980), with Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Standard-Same Harbor but Charted Channel A Re-
sponse, 35 Bus. LAw. 947 (1980).
53 See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
54 See, e.g., Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941).
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sions to resist takeover attempts, 55 and decisions to terminate deriv-
ative sUits. 5 6 The rule thus immunizes a wide range of corporate
conduct from anything more than cursory judicial review.
The business judgment rule implicitly recognizes the concepts
we have discussed: (1) the specialization of function in public cor-
porations whereby managers are entrusted to make business deci-
sions and shareholders rather than managers bear business risks; (2)
the poor incentives of shareholders and their attorneys to maximize
the value of the firm; and (3) the availability of alternative mecha-
nisms for assuring contractual performance. Because it restricts the
scope ofjudicial review, the business judgment rule reflects the lim-
its of liability rules in assuring contractual performance of managers
in public corporations.
B. The Substitution of Procedural for Substantive Review of
Conflict of Interest Transactions
By acting as monitors for investors, independent or disinter-
ested directors act as a substitute for liability rules in assuring con-
tractual performance. Corporate law has recognized this
monitoring function by allowing such directors to validate transac-
tions that would otherwise be tainted by conflict of interest. Thus, a
decision to resist a tender offer,57 dismiss a derivative suit,58 enter
into a transaction with an interested director,59 or negotiate a
merger with a related entity60 may be subject to a lower standard of
judicial review if it is made by disinterested directors. These deci-
sions allow firms to opt out of stricter standards ofjudicial review by
adopting alternative governance mechanisms. Similarly, the much-
maligned special litigation committee also can be viewed as a con-
tractual attempt by firms to opt out of liability rules enforced by
shareholder litigation as a governance mechanism.
C. Liberal Rights of Indemnification and Insurance
Corporate law provides firms with broad flexibility in deciding
whether to provide indemnification or insurance to managers for ex-
55 See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980);Johnson v.
Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
56 See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979); Roberts v. Alabama Power Co., 404 So. 2d 629 (Ala. 1981).
57 See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field 9c Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981).
58 See, e.g., Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett,
47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
59 See, e.g., Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971).
60 See, e.g, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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penses incurred in litigation. 61 Firms commonly indemnify and/or
insure corporate officers against litigation expenses and certain
types of judgments. This contractual response, which many have
criticized, 62 can be explained along the lines we have suggested. In-
demnification and insurance allow firms to contract around liability
rules in certain circumstances.
Public corporations are structured to transfer most business
risk to security holders who have access to capital markets and thus
have a comparative advantage in bearing risk. The threat of litiga-
tion if a particular decision turns out poorly, however, has the effect
of transferring the risk from security holders to managers who are
far less efficient risk bearers. Managers must be compensated for
bearing this risk which, by definition, is more efficiently borne by
security holders. The individual shareholder or his attorney who
owns only a nominal percentage of outstanding shares has no incen-
tive to take this (or any other) cost into account when deciding
whether to sue because other shareholders bear the cost. Indemni-
fication and/or insurance allows the firm to undo this inefficient
risk-bearing scheme by shifting risk to security holders of the firm or
an insurance company, both superior risk bearers. As such, one ma-
jor cost of liability rules-inefficient risk shifting-is minimized by
legal rules which allow widespread use of indemnification and
insurance.
D. The Exclusivity of the Appraisal Remedy
Mergers and other fundamental corporate changes have long
been major sources of litigation. Corporate law reduces the cost of
litigation in connection with mergers by often making appraisal-a
procedure by which shareholders dissatisfied with the terms of a
merger may obtain a judicial determination of the value of their
shares-the exclusive remedy.
63
Although appraisal is itself a type of litigation, the costs of lia-
61 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145() (1983) ("The indemnification provided
by this section shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those seeking
indemnification may be entitled under any bylaw, agreement, vote of stockholders or
disinterested directors or otherwise .. "). Corporations can also purchase insurance
for directors even where indemnification is prohibited. Id. § 145(g).
62 See, e.g., J. BISHOP, THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNI-
FICATION AND INSURANCE (1981). Bishop and others have argued that indemnification
and insurance erode the deterrent effect of liability rules. As Charles Goetz points out,
however, insurers may be superior monitors of managerial misconduct. Goetz, A Verdict
on Corporate Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit: Not Proven, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 344, 349
(1986). See also Holderness, Protection of Corporate Directors and Officers: A Theory of Liability
Insurance and Indemnification, (MERC Working Paper 84-13).
63 For a fuller discussion of the appraisal remedy, see Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy
in Corporate Law, supra note 29.
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bility rules as a method of assuring contractual performance that we
have discussed are largely absent in appraisal proceedings. This is
true for two reasons. First, appraisal does not involve a threat of
personal liability against directors. Thus there is no inefficient risk
shifting created by the appraisal remedy. Second, the incentive to
utilize the appraisal remedy strategically is much weaker than in
suits attempting to impose liability on corporate managers. Share-
holders who seek appraisal receive the value fixed by a court. This
value may be more or less than the value received by shareholders
from the transaction being dissented from. The prospect of receiv-
ing less in an appraisal proceeding than by going along with the
transaction and not seeking appraisal is a meaningful check on the
strategic use of litigation. Moreover, appraisal is, by definition, a
post-transaction remedy; it cannot be used to enjoin, or threaten to
enjoin, a value-increasing transaction. Because of the availability of
appraisal, remedies which might otherwise exist such as suits against
directors personally are not available.
E. Restrictions on the Ability to Bring Derivative Suits
A final set of legal rules which act to minimize the cost of liabil-
ity rules is restrictions on the ability to bring derivative suits. The
demand on directors requirement, the contemporaneous ownership
rule, security for expenses statutes, and, perhaps most importantly,
the ability of directors to dismiss derivative suits all limit the ability
of shareholders and their attorneys to bring derivative suits.64 The
rationale of these restrictions is that the costs of liability rules en-
forced by those with a small economic stake in the venture outweigh
the benefits unless limitations are imposed to reduce these costs.
65
Once again, the effect of this set of legal rules is to deemphasize the
role of liability rules in assuring contractual performance.
F. The Survival of the Derivative Suit
Notwithstanding the substantive limitations on the scope of lia-
bility rules and the procedural barriers to derivative suits, derivative
suits are still a part of corporate law. This survival of the derivative
suit suggests it has some value. The most likely explanation for the
64 Many of these restrictions on the ability to bring derivative suits are criticized in
Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 2.
65 Security for expenses statutes are explicitly based on this premise. Commenta-
tors frequently criticize these statutes on the ground that they deter both meritorious
and frivolous suits. See, e.g., Geviertz, Who Represents the Corporation? In Search of a Better
Method for Determining the Corporate Interest in Derivative Suits, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 265
(1985). Nonetheless, suits brought by those with a trivial stake in the firm are more
likely to be frivolous than suits brought by large shareholders. Thus, a strong argument
could be made that these statutes should be strengthened, not eliminated.
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survival of the the derivative suit is its role in deterring large one-
shot frauds. If there were no such thing as a derivative suit (we ig-
nore here the criminal law), managers could decide, at least in the-
ory, to distribute all of their firm's assets to themselves. 66 Perhaps
the derivative suit also plays a useful role in deterring other egre-
gious derelictions by corporate managers. But these limited, albeit
important, justifications for the derivative suit in no way suggest that
such suits should be brought more frequently or that legal rules that
discourage their incidence are detrimental to investors.
VI
THE ANALYSIS OF DERIVATIVE SUITS IN THE ALl PROJECT
The drafters of the ALl project recently circulated their revised
chapter on derivative suits. Much of the discussion of derivative
suits demonstrates an awareness of relevant economic principles
and evidence that other sections of the project have lacked.67 Thus,
the chapter begins with the statement that "it must be recognized
that the derivative action is neither the initial nor primary protection
for shareholders against managerial misconduct. ' 68 Similarly, the
draft recognizes that "private enforcement of law should not be ide-
alized" and that "[e]xperience suggests that the social costs associ-
ated with intracorporate litigation can sometimes outweigh their
benefits." 69 The discussion also acknowledges that the existing em-
pirical evidence sheds little light on the value of derivative suits. 7
0
Moreover, much of the analysis and criticism of aspects of current
law appears to be perceptive and convincing. 7'
For all of this, the drafters deserve credit. Indeed, our primary
criticisms of the section on derivative suits focus on the drafters'
failure to appreciate the logical implications of their own premises.
We discuss these criticisms below.
72
66 One-shot frauds can take various forms. For example, a decision to destroy all of
a firm's assets in response to a hostile takeover attempt is a type of one-shot fraud.
67 For a critique of an earlier version of the ALI Project, see Fischel, supra note 5.
68 ALI PROJEcr, supra note 1, Draft No. 5, at 2.
69 Id. at 3.
70 Id. at 5-7. Studies to date have focused on the frequency of derivative suits, their
rate of settlement, and amounts of recovery. See, e.g., Jones, An Empirical Evaluation of the
Incidence of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 1971-1978, 60 B.U.L. REV. 306
(1980). The problem with this type of study is that there is no way to interpret the data
without a theory of the role of liability rules enforced by shareholder litigation as well as
the evidence on the effect of such suits on shareholders' wealth.
71 See, e.g., ALI PROJECt, supra note 1, Council Draft No. 5, § 7.03, at 45-58 (discuss-
ing rationale and judicial interpretation of demand on directors requirement).
72 We make no attempt to be comprehensive; we do not discuss, for example, the




A. The Analysis of the Relationship Between Agency Costs
and Derivative Suits
The drafters' economic analysis of derivative suits focuses on
the separation of the management from risk-bearing functions in
public corporations. The drafters argue that "the self-regarding
manager may sometimes find it both possible and profitable to di-
vert income or assets from the corporation to himself."73 Although
monitoring mechanisms exist, the drafters note that "none of these
techniques is costless." ' 74 Thus, "there is a minimum level of expo-
sure to losses caused by managerial misbehavior that rational share-
holders must accept. . .. -75 Moreover, "[b]ecause only imperfect
information is available to the stock market about the agency cost
associated with any given firm, an efficient market will. . . discount
the value of each firm by an average agency cost factor."'76 The
drafters thus conclude that "the most important claim that can be
made for the derivative action is that it can reduce average agency
costs."
7 7
This reasoning is muddled. Using the existence of agency costs
as a justification for derivative suits is another classic example of a
Nirvana fallacy. As we have emphasized, liability rules enforced by
derivative suits impose costs of their own; these costs cannot be ig-
nored in analyzing the effect of such suits on shareholders' wealth.78
In other words, the existence of agency costs tells nothing about the
desirability of using derivative suits to enforce liability rules.
The related argument about average agency costs is also
flawed. To the extent the drafters claim that the inability of high
quality firms to distinguish themselves from low quality firms will
lead to a lemons market where all firms will degrade product qual-
ity,79 the argument is clearly false. No basis exists for assuming the
market for corporate securities is a lemons market. The combina-
tion of firms' actions in communicating information about them-
selves, monitoring by informational and financial intermediaries,
and antifraud rules all enable investors to distinguish firms of differ-
ing quality.8 0 That information is costly does suggest that high
73 ALl PROJECT, supra note 1, Council Draft No. 5, at 8.




78 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
79 The drafters cite Ackerlof, The Market for "Lemons". Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Qj. ECON. 488 (1970), for their proposition regarding average
agency costs; apparently they intend to compare the market for corporate securities to a
lemons market. ALI PROJECT, supra note 1, Council Draft No. 5, at 9.
80 For a more complete discussion of the methods used by high quality firms to
distinguish themselves, see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 34.
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quality firms will not be able to distinguish themselves perfectly.
But there is no reason to believe that the derivative suit will have
any effect on this "problem." Plaintiffs' attorneys are not likely to
have any comparative advantage in identifying mispriced securities;
even if they did, any resulting benefits would have to be balanced
against the costs of liability rules enforced by derivative suits.
Ultimately, the effect of derivative suits on shareholders' wealth
must be determined empirically. As summarized in Part III, we find
no evidence that investors value derivative suits highly as a cost-ef-
fective method of reducing agency costs.
B. The Relationship Between the Derivative Suit and
Governmental Control Over Corporate Activities
The drafters allege that the reduced need for public enforce-
ment is another benefit of the derivative suit. "Over the long run,"
the drafters claim, "the availability of private enforcement should
reduce the need for public enforcement and bureaucratic oversight
of corporate conduct." 8' Moreover, "[a]bsent [such a] remedy,
public agencies might be compelled to increase the regulatory over-
sight they exercise over the private corporation. ' 8 2
This claim has two serious difficulties. First, private enforce-
ment is not always desirable; indeed, in some situations, no enforce-
ment is optimal. Neither public nor private enforcement, for
example, would solve the "problem" of excess consumption of lei-
sure time. In other situations, public enforcement might be prefera-
ble to private enforcement-criminal law being one prominent
example. 3 Absent some notion of the nature and magnitude of the
problem sought to be remedied by the derivative suit or public en-
forcement, as well as the relative costs of different remedies, making
any meaningful statement about the desirability of private, public,
or no enforcement is simply impossible.
The analysis also fails to distinguish between social and private
benefit. Shareholders do not bear the costs of public enforcement.
Moreover, public enforcement is commonly directed at activities,
such as political payments and pollution, that benefit shareholders
of particular firms. Substituting public enforcement with derivative
suits forces shareholders, the supposed beneficiaries of such actions,
to bear the direct costs of enforcement as well as the indirect costs
of profitable opportunities foregone.
81 ALl PROJECT, supra note 1, Council Draft No. 5, at 3.
82 Id.
83 On the distinction between private and public enforcement, see, e.g., Landes &
Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4J. LEGAL SrUD. 1 (1975).
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C. Regulatory Bias
Current legal rules concerning derivative suits are highly va-
ried. Some jurisdictions impose procedural barriers to the filing of
derivative suits such as security for expenses statutes, others do
not;8 4 some jurisdictions make it relatively easy for directors to dis-
miss a derivative suit, others less easy, still others virtually impossi-
ble. 85 The reporters apparently view this diversity of legal rules as a
problem. The Reporter's Notes following specific sections repeat-
edly discuss why one particular legal rule is preferable to another or
why a compromise is desirable. Moreover, there is no suggestion
that a particular firm could opt out of a proposed legal rule-that a
firm could, for example, go public with a charter provision stating
that a special litigation committee's decision with respect to whether
a derivative suit should proceed is final.
8 6
The fundamental problem with the approach of the drafters is
that there is no theory or evidence demonstrating that the legal
rules proposed are superior in any way to the alternative rules that
are rejected. In light of the total absence of any support for the
legal rules proposed, the preferable approach is to allow firms maxi-
mum flexibility in choosing what legal rules to be governed by.
Competitive solutions are most beneficial when the optimal rule is
unclear or where optimal rules may be different for different firms.
It is perfectly plausible, for example, that derivative suits create net
benefits for some firms but net costs for others. Any attempt to for-
mulate a single legal rule for all firms, therefore, is likely to be
unproductive.
D. The Distinction Between the Duty of Care
and the Duty of Loyalty
Various sections in the chapter on derivative suits draw a sharp
84 Compare N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 627 (McKinney 1983) (requiring plaintiffs in de-
rivative actions to post security for expenses) with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1983)
(no requirement of security for expenses).
85 Compare Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979) (decision by independent members of special litigation committee to terminate
derivative suit subjected to scrutiny under business judgment rule), with Miller v. Regis-
ter & Tribune Syndicate, 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983) (directors named as defendants
cannot create special litigation committee to study whether derivative suit should be
dismissed), and Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (intermediate
standard).
86 This refusal to permit a corporation to minimize the scope of liability rules en-
forced by derivative suit contractually is particularly surprising since the drafters do al-
low corporations flexibility to draft more onerous provisions than the project
recommends. See ALI PROJECT, supra note 1, Council Draft No. 5, § 7.17(a), at 204-05




distinction between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.8 7 Po-
tential liability of defendants is greater for duty of loyalty viola-
tions,88 and it is more difficult to dismiss an action based on alleged
violations of the duty of loyalty. 89 The rationale for these distinc-
tions is that "alternative mechanisms, such as the market, peer pres-
sure and public disclosure, will normally ensure adequate
compliance with the duty of care without substantial reliance being
placed on litigation. . . . [A] litigation remedy should not be exten-
sively utilized when other mechanisms of accountability seem likely
to be adequate." 90
The distinction drawn between the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty is not at all clear. For example, there is no difference be-
tween working less hard than promised at a given level of compen-
sation (a breach of the duty of care) and being compensated more
than promised at a given level of work (a breach of the duty of loy-
alty). Both are examples of agency costs (conflicts of interest in an
economic sense) that reduce shareholders' wealth. Moreover, with
the possible exception of large one-shot frauds, a clear breach of the
duty of loyalty, where derivative suits or the criminal law are neces-
sary as a deterrent, it is far from obvious that alternative mecha-
nisms such as public disclosure, peer pressure or market forces
deter shirking more effectively than cheating. It is just as, or per-
haps more, plausible to make the opposite argument. Monitoring
compensation agreements, for example, is likely to be less costly
than monitoring effort. Indeed, the opportunity cost of excess lei-
sure and not working hard is probably the single largest source of
agency costs. Finally, there is once again no evidence in support of
the sharp distinction drawn by the drafters. Investors, as demon-
strated in Part IV above, do not value suits based on the duty of
loyalty any more than other types of suits.
E. The Significance of Diversification
The drafters emphasize the existence of diversification as ajus-
tification for derivative suits. "[B]ecause most shareholders hold a
diversified portfolio of securities," it is claimed, "the fact that costs
in an individual derivative action may exceed the recovery to the
87 Kenneth Scott has proposed eliminating derivative suits for duty of care viola-
tions while strengthening such suits for alleged violations of the duty of loyalty. See
Scott, supra note 2; see also Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate Law, and the ALI Corporate
Governance Project, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1984) (accord).
88 See ALI PROJECT, supra note 1, Council Draft No. 5, § 7.17(b) (ceiling on liability
for duty of care violations).
89 See id. § 7.08(c) (court should not dismiss derivative suit based on duty of loyalty
violation if defendant retains "improper" benefit).
90 Id. § 7.17 comment c, at 206-07.
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corporation is not necessarily adverse to their interests, if there is a
generic benefit to their broader interests as diversified shareholders
in the form of enhanced deterrence against unfair self-dealing." 9'
The argument, in other words, is that the deterrent effect of liability
rules to shareholders as a class justifies derivative actions even if
shareholders of the firm on whose behalf the suit is brought experi-
ence reductions in wealth. It is difficult to assess this argument be-
cause it is by definition impossible to test. But there are reasons for
skepticism. The claim implies that derivative suits are of major in-
terest to investors and thus should be widely reported. The facts,
however, are the opposite, as discussed in Part IV above. Moreover,
the relevant issue is not deterrence but the costs of increased deter-
rence. Shareholders, whether or not diversified, do not benefit from
legal rules that allow derivative suits to be brought in situations
where the costs (direct and indirect) of doing so exceed the benefits.
Finally, there is no possible way for the directors of a particular firm
or a court to determine the value of a precedent to investors of
other firms.92 Indeed, such value might be negative in light of the
costs of liability rules enforced by derivative suit. The existence of
diversification, in sum, does not provide a convincing rationale for
forcing investors of a particular firm to subsidize the maintenance of
a derivative suit that reduces the firm's value.
VII
CONCLUSION
Many analyses of corporate law assume that liability rules en-
forced by derivative suits play a fundamental role in aligning the
interests of managers and investors. We have shown that this wide-
spread assumption is not supported by either the theory of liability
rules, the available empirical evidence, or the structure of corporate
law. Proposals to reform corporate law which rest on this assump-
tion are thus highly suspect.
91 Id., reporter's note, at 9; see also id. § 7.08(a)(4) (derivative suit should not be
dismissed if dismissal would "frustrate any legal rule that operates for the protection of
shareholders").
92 On the more general question of the relationship between private and social
benefits from litigation, see Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a
Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL S-rUD. 333 (1982).
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
Cases Dismissed for Failure to Meet Demand Requirements
Case (company if not named) Decision Breach of
Date Duty of
Loyalty
Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 07/18/78
582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
Elfenbein v. Gulf & Western Indus., 12/21/78
590 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1978).
Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 02/29/80 x
634 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1980).
Haber v. Bell (Oneok Corp.), 06/13/83 x
465 A.2d 353 (Del. Ch. 1983).
Kemper v. American Broadcasting Co., 09/27/73
365 F. Supp. 1272 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
Laufer v. 01a Indus., 12/29/82
96 F.R.D. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), afjd, 729
F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1983).
Laufer v. Ola Indus., 04/29/83
729 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983).
Lewis v. Graves (McDermott), 02/28/83 x
701 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1983).
Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 06/18/81 x
91 F.R.D. 70 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
Shlensky v. Dorsey (Gulf Oil), 03/06/78
574 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1978).
Smachlo v. Birkelo (Burlington Northern), 12/27/83 x
576 F. Supp. 1439 (D.Del. 1983).
Stotland v. GAF Corp., 07/01/83 x
Del. Ch. Civ. Action No. 6876,
Longoliardi, V.C. (Sept. 1 1983).
Stotland v. GAF Corp., 12/05/83
469 A.2d 421 (Del. 1983).
Tanjer v. Sharon Steel Corp., 06/22/79
[1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,915 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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TABLE 2
Cases Dismissed Based on Rulings by Special Litigation
Committees
Case (company if not named) Decision Breach of
Date Duty of
Loyalty
Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 12/07/78
460 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Minn. 1978), affd,
603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979).
Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 09/07/82 x
546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982).
Abramowitz v. Posner (NFV), 02/09/82 x
513 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd,
672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982).
Ash v. IBM, 11/17/65
353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965).
Auerbach v. Bennet (GTE), 07/09/79
47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
Burke v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio R.R., 03/30/71
324 F. Supp. 1125 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
Gaines v. Haughten (Lockheed Aircraft Corp.), 05/18/81
645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981).
Genzer v. Cunningham (Burroughs), 09/26/80 x
498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
Issner v. Aldrich (National Distillers & Chem. 05/18/66 x
Corp.), 254 F. Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1966).
Lewis v. Anderson (Disney), 10/29/79 x
615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1980).
Maldonaldo v. Flynn (Zapata), 01/24/80
485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Meer v. United Brands Co., 02/21/79
[1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,794 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 08/16/82
544 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 09/06/83
573 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
Parkoffv. GTE, 03/11/80
74 A.D.2d 762, 425 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1980).
Rosengarten v. ITT Corp., 02/29/79
466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Stein v. Bailey (McDermott), 02/04/82
531 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Zapata v. Maldonado, 05/13/81




Cases Not Dismissed for Failure to Meet Demand Requirement
Demand Excused
Case (company if not named) Decision Breach of
Date Duty of
Loyalty
Altman v. Place (I.U. Int'l Corp.), 05/25/78 x
63 A.D.2d 639, 405 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1978).
Barr v. Wackman (Talcott Nat'l Corp.), 04/01/75 x
36 N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 368
N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975).
Bergstein v. Texas Int'l Co., 10/12/82
453 A.2d 467 (Del. 1982).
Fradkin v. Ernst (Mohawk Rubber Co.), 09/01/83
571 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
General Elec. Co. v. Bucyrs-Erie Co., 01/28/83
563 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
In re Caesar's Palace Sec. Litig., 05/23/73
360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Lum's
Inc. changed by time of suit to Caesar's
World).
Kaufman v. Beal, 02/25/83 x
Del. Ch. Civil Action No. 6485, Hartnett,
V. C. (Feb. 25, 1983).
Lewis v. Curtis (Hammermill Paper Co.), 03/03/82 x
671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1982).
Siegel v. Merrick (Twentieth Century Fox), 10/24/79
84 F.R.D. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Tarlov v. Paine Webber Cashfund, Inc., 03/15/83
559 F. Supp. 429 (D. Conn. 1983).
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TABLE 4
Cases Not Dismissed Contrary to Recommendation by Special
Litigation Committee: Business Judgment Rule Does
Not Apply
Case (company if not named) Decision Breach of
Date Duty of
Loyalty
Byers v. Baxter (Allied Chemicals Corp.), 06/26/79
69 A.D.2d 343, 419 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1979).
Galef v. Alexander (TRW), 01/22/80
615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980).
Gall v. Exxon Corp., 07/30/76 x
418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Levy v. Sterling Drug Co., 11/23/77
N.Y.L.., Nov. 23, 1977, at 10, col. 3 (N.Y.
A.D. 1977).
Maldonado v. Flynn (Zapata), 03/18/80 x
413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980).
Maher v. Zapata, 05/27/80
490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
TABLE 5
Average Abnormal Returns to the Stockholders of Firms Having
Derivative Suits Dismissed by Court Action
7o Abnormal Return
(t-statistic, % Negative)
Number Decision Decision Day Decision
Reason for Dismissal of Firms Day Plus One Day After Week*
Demand Requirements 14 -0.679 -1.365 -1.091
Not Met (-1.34,64) (-1.90,88) (-0.96,79)
Ruling of Special 18 -0.698 -0.092 0.475
Litigation Committee (- 1.72,61) (-0.16,61) (0.51,67)
TOTAL 32 -0.690 -0.650 -0.190
(-2.13,63) (- 1.42,73) (-0.26,72)
t = 1.96 at cc = .05
t = 2.34 at cc = .01
*Decision Day Plus Four Days After
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TABLE 6
Average Abnormal Returns to the Stockholders of Firms Having
Derivative Suits Challenged by Management But Not





Number Decision Decision Day Decision
of Firms Day Plus One Day After Week*
Demand Requirements Not Met 10 1.063 1.513 1.034
(Demand Excused) (1.10,40) (1.11,30) (0.480,60)
Ruling of Special 6 1.122 2.263 2.550
Litigation Committee (1.58,33) (2.25,33) (1.61,20)
(Business Judgment Rule
Does Not Apply)
TOTAL 16 1.085 1.794 1.602
(1.76,38) (2.06,31) (1.16,50)
t = 1.96 at a = .05
t = 2.34 at a = .01
*Decision Day Plus Four Days After
TABLE 7
Average Abnormal Returns to the Stockholders of Firms Involved







Plus One Day After
Suit Dismissed by 11 -0.759 -0.547 -1.261
Court Action (-1.16,55) (-0.59,64) (-0.86,73)
Suit Challenged by 6 1.00 0.078 1.246
Management But Not (0.80,33) (0.044,50) (0.45,50)
Dismissed by Court
t = 1.96 at a = .05
t = 2.34 at ct = .01
*Decision Day Plus Four Days After
1986]
Decision
Week*

